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We estimate a generalized linear model to examine adult and teenage cigarette demand. Our 
analysis focuses on the extent to which excise taxes and regulations restricting smoking in public 
places affect cigarette consumption. The adult results indicate that the price elasticity of demand 
is unstable over time, ranging from 0.06 in 1970 to -0.23 in 1985. These estimates are lower 
than most found in previous studies. The teenage price elasticity does not differ statistically from 
the estimates for adults. Additionally, regulations restricting smoking in public places have a 
significant effect on both adult and teenage cigarette demand. 
1. Introduction 
The results from over three decades of research on the health consequences 
of cigarette smoking have been astonishing, leading a former Surgeon 
General of the United States to conclude that smoking is ‘the chief, single 
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avoidable cause of death in our society and the most important public health 
issue of our time’ [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1982)]. 
Cigarettes are blamed for over 390,000 premature deaths annually, which 
represent a combined loss of approximately four million years of life [U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (1989), Centers for Disease 
Control (1987)].’ 
The toll taken by cigarette smoking has stimulated the development and 
implementation of a number of policies to control smoking. This paper 
examines two such policies: excise taxes and regulations restricting cigarette 
smoking in public places. 
Although cigarettes have been taxed by the federal government for over 
100 years and by all states for over 20 years, regulations limiting smoking in 
public places were relatively rare prior to 1970. However, the growth of these 
regulations during the 1970s was impressive. As of 1970, only 14 states had 
laws in place that limited smoking. By 1986, 41 states and the District of 
Columbia had enacted laws governing smoking in public places [U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (1986a)]. 
Although many states have laws that restrict smoking, the laws are not of 
equivalent stringency. In fact, the restrictiveness of the statutes varies 
considerably across states. For example, South Carolina restricts smoking on 
school buses only, while Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Washington 
each restrict smoking in 15 types of public places, including both public and 
private worksites. 
With the exception of the recent smoking ban on domestic airplane flights, 
no federal legislation has been passed that restricts smoking in public places 
(although regulations have been enacted to restrict smoking in some federal 
buildings), and local initiatives of any consequence did not materialize until 
the early- to mid-1980s. As a result, the regulations that this paper examines 
are exclusively at the state level. 
2. Selected cigarette demand studies 
Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes vary considerably. 
For example, Lewit and Coate (1982), in their review of United States studies 
completed since 1970, reported estimates that range from -0.40 to - 1.30. 
Estimates of the income elasticity of demand indicate that cigarettes are 
apparently income inelastic, with the estimates ranging from 0.08 to 0.93. 
The broad range in price and income elasticity estimates appears to be 
attributable to differences in both data and estimation techniques. Many 
‘Calculated using an average life expectancy of 75 years. 
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studies used aggregate time-series data to estimate demand models, with the 
unit of anaiysis being either the nation or the state. For example, Baltagi and 
Levin (1986) pooled cross-sectional and time-series data from 46 states 
between 1963 and 1980 to estimate their cigarette demand model. Their 
results showed an own price elasticity of -0.22 and a neighboring state price 
elasticity of 0.08. Fujii (1980) used time-series data and ridge regression 
techniques and found price and income elasticities of -0.47 and 0.22, 
respectively. Warner (1981) used aggregate time-series data from 1947 to 
1978 to obtain an estimated price elasticity of demand of -0.37. 
Only a handful of studies have used micro data to estimate cigarette 
demand models. Using data from the Health Examination Survey, Lewit et 
al. (1981) examined two measures of teenage smoking behavior: whether the 
teenager smoked and, if so, the quantity smoked per day. The estimated 
elasticities for both the smoking participation equation and the quantity 
smoked equation were large (i.e., - 1.19 and - 1.44) in relation to those 
found in other studies. 
Using data from the 1976 Health Interview Survey, Lewit and Coate 
(1982) estimated price and income elasticities of adult cigarette demand. The 
authors offer a cogent argument to support their view that using data on 
individuals is preferable to that of using states as the units of observation 
because the latter approach produces elasticity estimates that are biased 
away from zero. This bias results from the fact that sales figures based on 
taxes paid fail to adequately reflect actual consumption, because there is 
considerable smuggling or bootlegging of cigarettes from low to high tax 
states. To eliminate the potential for producing biased estimates, Lewit and 
Coate’s analysis excluded individuals who lived in communities where the 
price of cigarettes exceeded another price found within a 20 mile wide band 
around their place of residence. The regression estimates obtained from this 
‘restricted sample’ indicated an overall price elasticity of -0.42 and an 
income elasticity of 0.08. 
Finally, several recent studies have applied a ‘rational addiction’ model to 
cigarette demand. This modeling approach maintains that there are import- 
ant intertemporal linkages in cigarette consumption that should be 
accounted for in demand estimation efforts. Becker et al. (1990) used 
cigarette sales data from 1955 through 1985 to estimate a cigarette demand 
model based on a rational addiction framework. Their results indicated that 
a 10% permanent increase in the price of cigarettes reduced cigarette 
consumption by 4% in the short run and 7.5% in the long run. Using a 
similar analytic framework, Chaloupka (1990) found that men had a long- 
run price elasticity of -0.60, while women were unresponsive to cigarette 
price changes. Earlier, Mullahy (1985) estimated several cigarette demand 
models that accounted for past consumption, and found that the price 
elasticities obtained averaged - 0.47. 
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3. Data and methods 
Most of the data used in our analysis came from the National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS). The NHIS is a national survey of the civilian non- 
institutionalized population conducted annually by the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS) [for additional details on the NHIS sample design, 
see Schoenborn (1987)]. This analysis used data from seven of the nine 
smoking supplemental questionnaires administered between 1970 to 198.5. 
During this period, questions relating to smoking behavior were asked in the 
following nine years: 1970, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1983, and 
1985.’ 
In all, data on 207,647 individuals and their smoking habits were collected 
between 1970 and 1985 (excluding 1977 and 1978). However, due to NCHS 
confidentiality safeguards, a fraction of these individuals were excluded from 
the analysis. Specifically, in order to link an individual with an appropriate 
cigarette price, the individual’s location (i.e., primary sampling unit, or PSU) 
needed to be determined. However, the National Center for Health Statistics 
recodes the PSUs on the NHIS public use tapes for confidentiality reasons. 
Thus, to conduct this research, an arrangement was reached with NCHS staff 
that enabled us to assign cigarette prices to individuals in the data set while 
preserving the true identities of their PSUs. 
We assigned cigarette prices to individual respondents as follows. To begin 
with, each of three sets of PSUs were located on a map. The first set, which 
was used in the 1970 survey, contained 413 PSUs; the second, used from 
1974 through 1983, contained approximately 425 PSUs (although the 
number of PSUs used in a given year during this time period varied 
somewhat from this figure); and the third, used in 1985, had 235 PSUs. 
Second, using price data from the Tobacco Institute’s 1986 report, The Tax 
Burden on Tobacco, a cigarette price was determined for each PSU.3 
Next, following Lewit and Coate (!982), 20-mile bands were drawn around 
each PSU in order to determine whether the residents of the PSU bordered 
on an area that had lower-priced cigarettes.4 If any part of a given PSU 
*Unfortunately, due to dillicuhies in obtaining the 1977 and 1978 data, these years were 
excluded from the analysis. However, given that they fall more or less in the middle of the 
interval being studied, and that the surrounding years (i.e., 1976 and 1979) were included, it is 
unlikely that their omission resulted in a significant loss, in terms of the precision and stability 
of the estimates. 
aWe added local taxes in the PSU-specific prices if the PSU was located in, or encompassed, 
one of the 388 cities, towns, or counties that impose cigarette excise taxes. City and county 
population data were used to develop weighted average local taxes for the PSUs (which were 
typically counties) that encompassed a city or town that taxed cigarettes. 
4The choice of an appropriate band is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. Initially, we used both 
lO- and 20-mile bands around each PSU so that a sensitivity analysis could be performed to 
determine how the estimated parameters vary with alternative assumptions regarding the extent 
of informal bootlegging. However, due to the conditions imposed by NCHS, multiple bands 
would have required the elimination of an excessive number of PSUs. 
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was within 20 miles of a lower-priced area, then a ‘border’ variable for that 
PSU was assigned a value of one, otherwise the ‘border’ variable assumed a 
value of zero, The border variable was later used to account for the 
possibility of informal bootlegging, a situation in which a potential or 
confirmed smoker purchases cigarettes in a lower-price area while he or she, 
for instance, is commuting to work. Approximately 13% of the PSUs and 
observations were eliminated from the analysis as a result of a condition 
imposed by NCHS (to maintain confidentiality) that no PSU could contain a 
unique price/border variable combination. That is, there had to be at least 
two PSUs that had the identical price and border variable information. 
After the prices and border variables were merged with the NHIS data, we 
matched data on state regulations governing smoking in public places to the 
tile. States were identified through the price data, as prices vary by state. 
3.1. 
There is persuasive evidence that suggests that cigarette consumption from 
survey data such as the NHIS is because of the social 
undesirability 
underreporting varies with the level of 
consumption - for instance, whether heavy smokers are more apt to 
underreport their consumption than light ones - is not available. Conse- 
quently, we assumed that all consumption is by 
one-third. Moreover, because multiplicative 
self-reported cigarette 
consumption between 1974 and 1985 and found that the ratio of reported to (estimated) actual 
consumption was remarkably stable throughout the period. 
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may differ from adults because of the progression of addiction. Lewit et al. 
(1981) found that the price elasticity of demand for teenagers is substantially 
greater than the corresponding figure for adults. 
Unfortunately, the NHIS data do not contain smoking-related information 
on children under age 17 (or 20, depending on the year the survey was 
administered). Hence, in order to examine teenage smoking behavior we used 
a second data set: the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey II 
(NHANES II). This data set contains smoking and socioeconomic infor- 
mation that is comparable to that of the NHIS. The period of time covered 
in NHANES II ranged only between 1976 and 1980, and only 1,960 
teenagers were asked smoking-related questions. 
3.3. Price and income data 
Data on cigarette prices came from the Tobacco Institute. The Tobacco 
Institute publishes yearly state averages of prices weighted by type of sale 
(i.e., single package sold over-the-counter, carton, and vending machine). The 
weights used to calculate average price by state are based on national market 
shares by type of sale.’ 
Data on family income available in both the NHIS and NHANES are 
categorical. To obtain a point estimate for each category, we used data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), which measures income continuously, 
and estimated a set of means in the CPS data that correspond to the NHIS 
and NHANES income categories. We judged the CPS to be a good source of 
income data because it has a sampling frame similar to that of the NHIS. 
All data on cigarette prices and personal incomes were deflated to constant 
(1967) dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers 
(CPI-U). 
3.4. Regulation data 
Data on regulations restricting smoking in public places came from reports 
published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1986a, b), 
which included abstracts of the applicable laws. In some instances, we 
consulted state statutes because the abstracts were insufficient to determine 
when a particular statute was enacted. Taken together, these sources 
provided information on whether and, if so, when a particular state enacted a 
law that restricted smoking in each of the following places: public buses and 
trains, elevators, indoor recreational or cultural facilities, retail stores, 
‘The use of these price data could potentially introduce an endogeneity problem if relatively 
heavy smokers are more likely to purchase their cigarettes by the carton (i.e., the lowest priced 
method of purchase). Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we are unable to control for 
method of purchase. 
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restaurants, schools, health care facilities (e.g., hospitals and nursing homes), 
public meeting rooms, libraries, rest rooms, waiting rooms, public worksites, 
private worksites, and ‘other’ public places (e.g., jury rooms, halls and stairs, 
polling places, and prisons). Additionally, we determined whether laws were 
enacted that restricted the sale or distribution of cigarettes to minors. 
We collapsed these data into a regulation index, which was similar to one 
described in the Surgeon General’s 1986 report [U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (1986a)]. The U.S. DHHS index is an updated and 
modified version of an index developed by Warner (1981). States that 
regulate smoking in a large number of places and/or places where people 
spend a large fraction of their time received higher scores than states that 
only limit smoking in a handful of relatively unimportant places (e.g., 
elevators). If a state restricted smoking in private worksites, then it received a 
score of one, because people spend more time at work than any other place 
outside the home. States that restricted smoking in restaurants, but not in 
private worksites, received a score of 0.75. If a state failed to restrict smoking 
in both private worksites and restaurants but imposed restrictions on 
smoking in at least four other public places, then it received a score of 0.50. 
States that had between one and three of these relatively minor restrictions 
in place were scored 0.25, and states with no regulations in place received a 
score of zero. Specification tests indicated that this scaling was appropriate. 
3.5. Dependent and explanatory variables 
Cigarette consumption was measured in terms of packs per day, with 
nonsmokers’ consumption set at zero. Packs per day equal the reported 
number of cigarettes smoked per day divided by 20. 
The adult and teenage equations share many of the same explanatory 
variables. Both equations, for instance, contain price, regulation, age, sex, 
race, education, family income, family size, and year variables. Past studies 
have shown that all of these variables influence smoking behavior, with the 
exception of the regulation index, which has never been used in a multiple 
regression analysis.’ 
The adult model also included a set of variables defining birth cohorts. 
Although previous econometric studies of cigarette demand have ignored 
cohort effects, the prevalence of smoking varies considerably by cohort 
[Harris (1983)]. Cohort variables could control for an individual’s exposure 
to various cultural aspects of smoking - for example, its increased popularity 
among men during World War II and the recent advent of a strong anti- 
smoking movement that developed in response to the adverse health effects 
‘Several authors, however, have used regression techniques to examine the effects of 
regulations. For example, Chaloupka (1988) included a dummy variable indicating whether a 
state passed a Clean Indoor Air law in his analysis of smoking demand. 
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smoking. These effects cannot be fully captured by including only age and 
year variables in the model.’ 
3.6. Statistical analysis 
We estimated a generalized linear model of the type suggested by Nelder 
and Wedderburn (1973) and McCullagh and Nelder (1983), using an iterative 
weighted least squares technique. While this estimation approach is similar 
to ordinary least squares (OLS), it is preferable to OLS for modeling 
cigarette demand. 
OLS was rejected as the primary modeling approach for several reasons. 
To begin with, a preliminary analysis of the data revealed that, with respect 
to the number of packs smoked, the mean and the variance were roughly 
equivalent, which suggested a generalization of the Poisson distribution. 
Second, as is the case with many demand functions, we expected a 
multiplicative or proportional relationship rather than an additive one. This 
was later conftrmed empirically through a series of log-scale linearity tests. 
Third, least squares does not address well the truncation of consumption at 
zero combined with the skewed consumption. 
We found the pseudo-Poisson specification attractive for three reasons. 
First, it is in many ways analogous to more familiar regression techniques in 
that E(n, 1 Xit) = /zit, where n, is the count of packs smoked at time t and i. is 
the Poisson parameter of the form logi.=x/?, where x is a matrix of K 
columns, with each column being a vector of T observations on one of K 
independent variables and /I is a column vector of K unknown parameters to 
be estimated. Second, the ‘zero problem’ (i.e., a substantial fraction of the 
observations are not current smokers) is a natural outcome of Poisson 
processes. Hence, the use of this sort of model avoids the problems found in 
typical logarithmic regression models in which the dependent variable can 
assume a value of zero. Third, as we will see, the pseudo-Poisson model is 
relatively easy to interpret. 
The model we estimated departs from a true Poisson model because it 
allowed for fractional packs of cigarettes. This, however, should neither affect 
the parameter estimates nor the inferences drawn from the model because we 
estimated the model by iteratively weighted least squares. To avoid confu- 
sion, we will refer to the model as the generalized linear model. 
To both contirm and decompose the generalized linear model’s results, we 
estimated a two-part model of the demand for cigarettes based on a model 
developed by Cragg (1971). Once again, separate equations were estimated 
for adults and teenagers. Using logistic regression analysis, we first estimated 
‘Because we included age, cohorts, and year in the model, the age variables are diflkult to 
interpret directly. Essentially, the age variables measure within-cohort aging etTects. 
J. Wasserman et al., The effbcts of excise taxes and regulations on cigarette smoking 51 
a model of an individual’s decision to smoke as a function of the same 
covariates used in the generalized linear model. A dichotomous dependent 
variable was used to indicate whether an individual was a current smoker. 
The second part of the model was estimated using ordinary least squares, 
and showed the level of demand for current smokers. The same set of 
covariates used in the smoking decision equation was used to predict the 
quantity of cigarettes smoked. This equation, then, was conditioned on 
smoking. The overall demand for cigarettes can be obtained by multiplying 
the probability equation by the conditional one.” 
3.7. Split sample 
To ensure that the models did not ‘overtit’ the data, we used a split sample 
approach for model estimation. We conducted exploratory data analyses 
using a random subsample of 42,412 NHIS cases, roughly 257; of the 
available cases.” However, after eliminating cases with missing data, the 
number of cases that remained in the subsample fell to 34,703. There did not 
appear to be any systematic differences between the cases with and without 
complete data. 
After estimating the models, a simple one degree of freedom test - in 
which the residuals were regressed on the forecasts for all data that were not 
used to estimate the models - was used to validate the models. After 
validation, the final models were reestimated using all of the remaining data, 
which increased the precision of the estimated parameters. Although the 
basic structures of the models proved sound when they were reestimated 
using the larger data set, some important interaction effects were detected. 
3.8. Teenage cigarette demand model 
We followed a similar modeling approach for estimating teenage cigarette 
demand. The major differences between the two models included different 
data sets (as mentioned earlier) and a somewhat different set of covariates. 
For example, the teenage model did not include education variables, because 
the presence of compulsory education through age 16 results in an almost 
perfect correlation between education and age.” Instead, a set of variables 
“The formula used to calculate the overall price elasticity of demand was r)= 
(1 -p) (a1 +a, x year)+(jT, +jz x year), where q is the price elasticity of demand; p is predicted 
from the logistic equation and equals l/Cl +e’-“‘I; a, and zI are the logit coelficients for 
log(price) and log(price) x year, respectively; and j?, and /?* are the conditional coefhcients for 
log(price) and log(price) x year. 
“Based on a series of power calculations, a 25% sample was determined to be more than 
adequate for detecting small price and regulation effects. 
‘*While it might be interesting to include a dummy variable indicating whether an individual 
was a high school dropout, the available data were insufficient to construct such a variable. 
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indicating the level of education attained by the head of each teenager’s 
household was entered in the models. Because the probability of smoking is 
negatively correlated with education, these variables serve as a proxy for 
parental smoking habits, which are known to affect teenage smoking 
behavior [Hirschman et al. (1984), Syme and Alcalay (1982)]. 
Several other variables used to model adult cigarette demand were not 
used in the analysis of teenage smoking, including: (1) birth cohort, due to 
the narrow time span of the teenage data (19761980), and (2) price-year and 
income-year interactions, again due to the narrow time span. We included in 
the teenage equations an indicator variable for the presence of a law in each 
respondent’s state of residence that restricted the sale or distribution of 
cigarettes to minors. 
3.9. The ‘border problem’ 
Informal bootlegging of cigarettes may occur in instances where a 
particular area borders on another that has lower-priced cigarettes. Even 
where the difference in cigarette prices between neighboring areas is small, 
smokers have an incentive to purchase cigarettes in the lower-priced area if 
they happen to be in that area for some other reason (work, recreation, etc.). 
Consequently, separate models were estimated using (1) all of the cases, and 
(2) only those cases that did not border on an area with lower cigarette 
prices. I3 Because including the border cases in the analysis adds systematic 
measurement error into the price variable, which in turn biases the estimated 
coeff%ients, we report only the non-border results for adults.14 
In the case of teenagers, however, the decision as to which set of results is 
appropriate (i.e., those estimated using all of the cases or just the non-border 
ones) is less clear, as arguments can be made either way. To be sure, 
teenagers must engage in at least some amount of bootlegging, because in 
many places they are able to drive beginning at age 16. On the other hand, 
because the NHANES II data include teenagers between the ages of 12 and 
17, roughly two-thirds of the teenage respondents are unable to drive 
(although some may have older friends who can). Additionally, teenagers 
may have fewer opportunities to purchase cigarettes in lower-priced areas. 
Rather than attempt to resolve this issue on theoretical grounds, we 
estimated the teenage generalized linear model with and without border 
cases. We found that the coefficients included in the model were insensitive 
“A Wald test was performed to test for difierences between a generalized linear model 
estimated with just ‘border’ cases and one that included only ‘non-border’ cases. The test 
revealed that the estimated parameters were significantly different (~~0.025). 
“Approximately one-third of the respondents lived in border areas. Given the large number 
of cases available for analysis, omitting the border people did not appreciably affect the 
precision of the estimates. 
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to the inclusion of border cases. However, we were able to obtain more 
precise estimates by including the border cases, as doing so increased the 
sample size by approximately 50%. Consequently, the teenage results 
reported below are based on all of the available observations on teenagers. 
4. Results 
4.1. Adult demand for cigarettes 
Table 1 contains the results for four different specifications of the 
generalized linear (Poisson-like) model. The four equations differ as follows: 
- Eq. (l), which is the ‘base’ model, contains variables for price, regulation, 
income, and year (coded as 70, 74. 76, etc.). 
- Eq. (2) adds variables for age and sex to the variables included in eq. (1). 
- Eq. (3) adds a group of variables measuring cohort effects to the same set 
of variables as eq. (2). 
- Eq. (4) is the full cigarette demand model. 
The model’s coefficients can be interpreted as representing the overall 
effects of each covariate on smoking behavior. That is, because both the 
‘zeros’ (i.e., never- and former-smokers) and current smokers were used to 
estimate the equations, the coefficients account for the effects of the variables 
on both the decision to smoke and, given that one decides to smoke, the 
number of packs smoked per day. 
The main parameters of interest (i.e., price and regulation) are somewhat 
sensitive to the equation’s specification. For example, the magnitude of the 
price coefficient more than doubles going from the base model to the full 
model. The coefficients for most of the remaining variables, however, appear 
to be relatively stable across equations. 
Several other findings are noteworthy. First, there are statistically signifi- 
cant price-year and income-year interactions, indicating that the price and 
income elasticities of demand are changing over time.r5 Second, the regula- 
tion index has a consistently strong negative influence on the number of 
packs smoked - more stringent regulation significantly reduces cigarette 
consumption. Third, taken together, the education and education-year inter- 
action variables exhibit the expected pattern - that is, cigarette consumption 
declines as education increases. Fourth, cohort effects appear to be important 
(particularly with respect to males), as evidenced by the coefficients and I- 
statistics for the cohort and male-cohort interaction variables.16 Fifth, other 
“Other studies [e.g., Laughhunn and Lyon (1971)] found no such interaction effects, and, 
consequently, concluded that the demand for cigarettes was stable. 
‘“An F-test indicated that the cohort and male-cohort variables were significant at the 0.001 
level. 
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Table 1 
Estimated generalized linear model regression equations for packs per day (adults) 
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1900 Birth cohort x male 
1910 Birth cohort x male 
1920 Birth cohort x male 
1930 Birth cohort x male 
1940 Birth cohort x male 
1950 Birth cohort x male 
Table 1 (continued) 







































‘Sample size = 84,301. 
factors equal, whites smoke more than non-whites. Finally, with the excep- 
tion of the people who were never married (which includes young people 
who may yet start to smoke), married people smoke less than those who are 
not married. 
4.2. Price and income elasticities of demand 
Because there are significant price-year and income-year interactions, one 
must compute price and income elasticities on a year-by-year basis. In the 
case of price elasticities, this can be accomplished using the following 
formula: 
(1) 
where 4 is the price elasticity of demand, /?I is the log(price) coefficient, and 
p2 is the log(price) x year coefficient. The income elasticity can be computed 
as follows: 
E = ( fi3 + fi4 x year) x income, (2) 
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Table 2 
Estimated price and income elasticities of demand 
generalized linear model (adults) (standard errors in 
parentheses). 
Year Price elasticity” Income elasticity’ 
1970 0.059 0.05 1 
(0.076) (0.015) 
1974 -0.017 0.03 1 
(0.062) (0.014) 
1976 - 0.055 0.02 I 
(0.063) (0.015) 
1979 -0.112 0.007 
(0.075) (0.016) 
1980 -0.131 0.002 
(0.08 1) (0.017) 
1983 -0.188 -0.013 
(0.102) (0.020) 
1985 -0.226 - 0.023 
(0.118) (0.022) 
198gb -0.283 -0.038 
(0.143) (0.025) 
“Computed using the fully specified model [i.e., eq. (4)]. 
bExtrapolated. 
where E is the income elasticity of demand, p3 is the income coefftcient, j4 is 
the income x year coefficient, and income is average family income. 
Price and income elasticities of demand, calculated using eq. (4) in table 1, 
for each of the years included in the data set as well as for 1988 are shown in 
table 2. The predictions for 1988 are extrapolations beyond the range of the 
data and, as such, may not be valid indications of current elasticities. 
Although the price elasticity has become increasingly negative over time, 
the estimated price elasticities are low in comparison to previous estimates.” 
Using the 1985 estimate, if the price of cigarettes were increased by IO%, 
overall per capita smoking would decrease by 2.3x, or roughly a fifth of a 
cigarette per day if we allow for underreporting.‘* 
The estimated income elasticities change from positive to negative over 
time, indicating that cigarettes may now be an inferior good. However, with 
the exceptions of 1970 and 1974, the estimated elasticities are not statistically 
“For the most part, the estimated price elasticities for adjacent years are not statistically 
different from each other. However, there is a statistically significant difference between 1970 (or 
1974) and 1985. 
“These calculations are based on a population that includes smokers and non-smokers, 
because the data used to estimate the model included people with zero and positive 
consumption. Thus, the estimated decreases in consumption, which are presented in terms of 
cigarettes, can result from a decrease in the smoking participation rate and/or a reduction in the 
number of cigarettes smoked per smoker. The mean number of reported packs smoked per day 
was 0.34. 
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different from zero. These estimates are low in comparison to estimates 
reported in the literature, which is probably attributable to the more recent 
data that were used in this study - data that reflect the changing demo- 
graphics of cigarette smokers (i.e., a disproportionate number of poor, and 
poorly educated, people are now smokers).‘9*20 
4.3. Effect of regulations on cigarette demand 
The other policy variable of interest is the regulation index. This index had 
a depressing effect on cigarette consumption across all specifications in table 
1, and the magnitude of the effect was robust to the set of covariates 
included in the equation. The percentage change in packs smoked due to an 
increase in the regulation index can be computed using the estimated 
coefftcient from the full model [table 1, eq. (4)] as follows: 
Percent change in packs smoked = [e-o.o81x - l] x 100, (3) 
where x is a regulation index value. If legislators passed a law that would 
increase the index from 0.25 to 1 - for example by increasing the stringency 
of the laws in place from restricting smoking in a handful of minor places 
(e.g., waiting rooms, libraries, etc.) to restricting smoking at private worksites 
- then overall per capita smoking would decrease by 5.9%.2’*2’ To achieve 
the same percentage reduction through a tax-induced price increase, the 
current price of cigarettes would have to increase by approximately 317$23 
4.4. Teenage demand for cigarettes 
Table 3 shows the results from the generalized linear model for teenagers. 
‘90~r modeling approach did not enable us to distinguish educated people who never 
smoked from quitters. Because well-educated people have been more likely to quit in 
comparison to poorly-educated people, part of the observed income and education effects may 
be attributable to this phenomenon. 
“‘The NHIS data set identities each family’s income category (e.g., $15,COO-S19,999). As a 
result, attempts such as ours to impute an income value for each category (e.g., 517,547) will 
measure a family’s true income with error. The elfect of these errors in the variables will be to 
bias our estimated income elasticities toward zero. 
“We cannot dismiss the possibility that the regulation elTect is endogenous or reflects the 
omitted variable bias due to the effect of public sentiment against smoking on the propensity to 
start smoking. However, it is likely that the within-state variance associated with smoking is 
considerably greater than the between-state taste for cigarettes variance, the latter of which may 
influence the stringency of the regulations. We address this issue further in the discussion 
section. 
“At the suggestion of a reviewer, we tested for a regulation index-year interaction and found 
that it reduced the price and price-year interaction variables to insignificance. However, the 
inclusion of the regulation-year interaction introduced substantial multicollinearity into the 
equation. 
23Calculated using the 1985 estimated elasticity of -0.23. 
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Table 3 
Estimated generalized linear model coeficients for packs per day 
(teenagers).’ 







Household head education <High School 
Household head education, High School 





Prohibits sale to minors 
“Sample size = 1,891. 
- 8.583 - 1.655 
0.859 1.448 
- 0.038 - 0.696 
0.065 0.612 
-0.537 - 1.101 




- 0.034 -0.277 
0.435 9.923 
- 1.402 -5.521 
-0.701 -2.104 
0.141 0.703 
Price has a statistically insignificant effect on consumption and is of the 
‘wrong’ sign (i.e., price is positively related to consumption).24 Given the 
coefhcient’s standard error of 0.59 (not shown) and a 95% confidence interval 
ranging between -0.30 and 2.02, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
teenage price elasticity of demand is statistically different from the adult 
estimate of -0.23 for 1985. However, the teenage price elasticity estimate 
differs significantly from Lewit et al.‘s (1981) teenage price elasticity estimates 
of - 1.19 for the decision to smoke and - 1.44 for the quantity smoked. 
In contrast to price changes, anti-smoking regulations appear to have a 
strong negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05) effect on consumption. 
Specifically, if the regulation index were increased from 0.25 to 1, teenage 
consumption would decline by 41%. 25 However, once we control for other 
regulations, the dummy variable indicating whether there is a law or 
regulation in effect in the respondent’s state governing the sale of cigarettes 
to minors is statistically insignificant. 
Teenage cigarette consumption is negatively related to both family income 
and parental education. Because these variables are also negatively related to 
%i the absence of any interaction terms involving the price variable, the price coefhcient can 
be interpreted directly as the elasticity of demand. 
‘sThe regulation index is most effective in preventing teens from starting to smoke, rather 
than in encouraging current teenage smokers to curtail their consumption (results not shown). It 
should be noted that although the regulation index value of 1 signifies that a regulation is in 
place that restricts smoking in private worksites, states that regulate smoking in private 
worksites also typically regulate smoking in a variety of other public places, including places 
frequented by teenagers (e.g., schools, libraries, and sports arenas). 
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Table 4 





Level of smoking 
by current 
smokers Total 
1970 0.059 0.013 0.072 
1974 0.002 -0.015 -0.013 
1976 -0.028 - 0.029 - 0.057 
1979 - 0.074 - 0.050 -0.124 
1980 -0.090 -0.057 -0.147 
1983 -0.139 - 0.078 -0.217 
1985 -0.171 - 0.092 -0.263 
Table 5 
Selected two-part model coeflicients (r-statistics in parentheses). 
Probability Level of smoking 
Variable of smoking by current smokers 
Log(price) 
Year 
Log(price) x year 
Income 











( - 3.95) 
-0.045 













parental smoking behavior, they may serve as proxies for parental behavior 
in the teenage demand models. Hence, the increased propensity to smoke by 
children of poorly educated adults may not be due to the fact that their 
parents were poorly educated, but rather because their parents were more 
likely to smoke. 
4.5. Two-part model results 
Although the generalized linear model provides estimates of overall price 
and regulation effects, the two-part model shows where in the smoking 
process each of the determinants of the demand for cigarettes exerts its 
greater influence. The two-part model also serves to check the robustness of 
the results from the generalized linear model. 
Tables 4 and 5 show estimated price elasticities and selected coefficients 
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from the two-part model, respectively.26 Table 4 indicates that price changes 
have their greatest effect on the decision to become a smoker rather than on 
the number of cigarettes smoked, given that one has chosen to smoke. 
Additionally, the total price elasticity estimates from the two-part model are 
very close to the generalized linear model estimates. Thus, the price elasticity 
estimates appear insensitive to the statistical method used to model cigarette 
demand. 
The regulation index only had a statistically significant effect on the 
number of cigarettes smoked, not the decision to be a current smoker. 
Hence, for relatively mature smokers, regulations restricting smoking in 
public places may reduce consumption simply by limiting opportunities to 
smoke. 
We also used the two-part model to examine the effects of prices and 
regulations on teenage smoking. Price did not have a statistically significant 
effect in either of the model’s parts. The regulation index exerted a 
statistically significant influence in the logit for the probability of being a 
smoker but not in the conditional equation. This is the precise opposite of 
the adult two-part model results, where the regulation index was only 
statistically significant in the conditional equation. Because more of the 
variance in cigarettes smoked among teenagers is in the decision to smoke, 
this result is not surprising. In sum, although laws and regulations restricting 
smoking in public places may not affect adults’ decisions to continue to 
smoke, but merely the number of cigarettes smoked, regulations appear to 
have an important influence on teenagers’ decisions to start smoking. 
5. Discussion 
Our analysis of adult cigarette demand suggests that the price elasticity of 
demand is low. Moreover, the structure of the demand for cigarettes is 
changing over time, as the statistically significant price-year and income-year 
interactions indicate. The point estimates of the price elasticity have gone 
from 0.06 in 1970 to -0.23 in 1985. These estimates are low in comparison 
to earlier studies. However, it should be noted that the 95% confidence 
interval for the 1985 estimate spans -0.46 to 0.005, a range that encom- 
passes several of the earlier estimates [e.g., Lewit and Coate (1982), Warner 
(1981), Witt and Pass (1983), Young (1983)]. Nevertheless, people may be 
less responsive to cigarette price changes than previously thought. Addition- 
ally, we found that regulations restricting smoking in public places have a 
significant negative effect on cigarette demand. 
The teenage smoking results suggest that teenagers may not be as 
26The complete results of the two-part model are reported in Wasserman (1988). 
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responsive to price changes as previous studies found. However, regulations 
restricting smoking in public places appear to have a considerable impact on 
teenage smoking behavior. In contrast to adults, regulations affect the 
teenager’s decision to become a smoker rather than the number of cigarettes 
smoked, given that he or she becomes a smoker. 
5.1. Comparisons with the literature 
To better understand why our results diverge from those reported in the 
literature, we used 1976 NHIS data and attempted to replicate the demand 
equations estimated by Lewit and Coate (1982) for adults. We obtained 
coefficients that were strikingly similar, indicating that major errors in data 
entry and/or coding could be ruled out as a source of discrepancies in the 
results of the two studies. However, when we added the regulation index to 
the Lewit and Coate specification, we found that the price coefficients for the 
three equations they estimated (i.e., number of cigarettes smoked by smokers 
and non-smokers, using zero for non-smokers; smoking participation; and 
number of cigarettes smoked by smokers) dropped dramatically. Thus, a 
substantial portion of the difference between our price elasticity estimates 
and the higher estimates found in other studies can in all likelihood be 
attributed to our inclusion of the regulation index. Given the positive 
correlation between prices and regulations, the earlier studies’ results may be 
biased upward due to the omission of regulations from their models. 
Although the regulation index variable appears important, some might 
argue that it is properly considered endogenous, whereas we have treated it 
as exogenous. Moreover, the price variable could perhaps also be considered 
endogenous. We agree that if the state or locality were the unit of 
observation, regulations and prices may well be endogenous. In our work, 
however, the individual is the unit of observation, so any simultaneous 
equations bias should be nil for either price or regulation. Put another way, 
any individual’s decision to smoke will negligibly influence the willingness of 
legislators to enact laws restricting smoking in public places or raise cigarette 
taxes. 
A more plausible model might hold that public sentiment against smoking 
produces higher taxes, more stringent regulations, peer pressure to refrain 
from smoking, and so on. However, because public sentiment is difficult to 
measure, it has been excluded from virtually all data sets that have been used 
to model cigarette demand. Consequently, all correlated but included vari- 
ables will suffer from an omitted variable bias, with the omission of a public 
sentiment variable biasing both the price and regulation index coefficients 
away from zero. One could even argue that the failure to include a direct 
measure of public sentiment is an indictment of all micro studies of cigarette 
demand published to date. But in defense of our own study, if public 
J.H.E.-C 
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sentiment is important, the inclusion of a proxy (i.e., the regulation index) 
should reduce the omitted variable bias in the estimated price coefficient. 
5.2. Policy implications 
In assessing the policy implications of these results, it is important to 
recognize that developing effective and economically efficient policies to 
discourage smoking is inherently difiicult. The fact that there are over 50 
million smokers, that there are strong addictive aspects of smoking, and that 
much remains to be learned about the costs and benefits of alternative 
smoking reduction strategies mean that we are still some time away from 
transforming our society into a smoke-free one. Needless to say, virtually all 
proposals for reducing smoking have been fraught with controversy, as they 
may impinge on individuals’ rights (both smokers’ and non-smokers’), and/or 
threaten the financial well-being of firms connected with the production and 
distribution of cigarettes and other tobacco products. 
Perhaps the largest problem associated with using cigarette excise taxes to 
reduce consumption is determining the appropriate level of taxation. As this 
and other analyses suggest, people are at least somewhat responsive to 
cigarette price changes (i.e., the elasticity of demand is not zero). The 
relatively inelastic demand for cigarettes suggests that it may take moderate 
to large cigarette taxes to reduce smoking substantially. Nevertheless, these 
results do not, in and of themselves, guide us tothe precise level at which the 
tax should be set, and different rationales for levying taxes necessarily imply 
different tax levels [Manning et al. (1989)]. 
A second difficulty associated with cigarette excise taxes concerns the 
distributional consequences of higher taxes. As we have seen, cigarette 
smoking is increasingly becoming a phenomenon associated with the poor 
and less-educated people in our society. Moreover, given the absence of a 
price-income interaction effect, it appears that the poor are no more 
responsive to price changes than the wealthy. Thus, in light of these elasticity 
estimates, higher prices will simply lead to increased expenditures on 
cigarettes while achieving only moderate decreases in consumption. The 
fraction of a poor smoker’s income that is spent on cigarettes will increase 
vis-a-vis that of the wealthy smoker. On the other hand, because tobacco tax 
revenues only account for a small fraction of all federal and state tax 
revenues, relatively small changes in the income tax structure could be used 
to compensate for the effect of higher cigarette taxes on the distribution of 
income. Whether this type of compensation would be politically feasible is 
uncertain. 
The case for discouraging smoking through regulation is also less than 
clear-cut. For example, there are important property rights issues at stake - 
i.e., the right of non-smokers to a smoke-free environment vs. the right of 
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smokers to smoke wherever and whenever they want.*’ Additionally, despite 
the significant negative effect of the regulation index used in both the adult 
and teenage demand models, we cannot dismiss the possibility that a 
particular state’s regulations may reflect its population’s anti-smoking atti- 
tudes and not cause lower consumption. However, as already discussed, the 
use of micro data to estimate cigarette demand militates against this 
possibility. 
In addition to reducing opportunities to smoke, stringent regulations are 
bound to convey to the smoker that his or her behavior is in some sense 
socially unacceptable, and most of us are at least somewhat susceptible to 
messages we receive regarding the social desirability of our actions. Interest- 
ingly, the regulation index has its strongest impact on teenagers, who may be 
even more sensitive to how others view their behavior than adults. A final 
benefit associated with the regulatory approach is that it concomitantly offers 
non-smokers protection against passive smoking while frequenting those 
places where smoking is either restricted or prohibited. 
27From an economic perspective, government action to resolve these property rights is 
warranted due to the high transaction costs that would be incurred if dispute resolution in this 
area were to assume a market orientation. 
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